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INTRODUCTION
I remember as a child having to describe Pakistan as that small
country next to India. I haven't used that description in a long time. By
now, Americans have heard of Pakistan, and the reference is no longer
exotic. Instead, the name conjures up confused images of women and
non-Muslims in a third world country struggling to battle Islamic funda-
mentalism. Recent reports of the unjust application of Pakistan's rape
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laws, enacted as part of the "Islamization" of Pakistani law, further
cement the impression that Islam is bad for women. These reports,
unfortunately, are true. The impression is not.
This article critiques the rape laws of Pakistan from an Islamic point
of view which is careful to include women's perspectives in its analysis.
Unlike much of what is popularly presented as traditional Islamic law,
this woman-affirming Islamic approach will reveal the inherent gender-
egalitarian nature of Islam, which is too often ignored by its academics,
courts, and legislatures. This article will demonstrate how cultural
patriarchy has instead colored the application of certain Islamic laws in
places like Pakistan, resulting in the very injustice which the Quran so
forcefully condemns.
I. CRITIQUE OF THE ZINA ORDINANCE
A. Power of Law: The Zina Ordinance and
Its Application in Pakistan
In 1977, under President Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan enacted a set of
"Hudood"' ordinances, ostensibly to bring the laws of Pakistan into
"conformity with the injunctions of Islam."2 These ordinances, setting
forth crimes such as theft, adultery, slander, and alcohol consumption,
became effective in February, 1979. 3 The "Offence of Zina (Enforce-
ment of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979" (Zina Ordinance) criminalizes
"zina," or "extramarital sexual relations" (also a crime under Islamic
law).4 The Zina Ordinance states:
A man and a woman are said to commit 'zina' if they wilfully
have sexual intercourse without being validly married to each
other.
1. The word "hudood' is the plural of "hadd," a term denoting the Islamic legal categori-
zation of crimes for which the definition and punishment is set by God. See 'ABDUR RAHMAN
I. Doi, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 221 (1984).
2. Offense of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance No. VII of 1979, Pmbl. [herein-
after Zina Ordinance]. The text of the Ordinance can be found in THE ALL PAKISTAN LEGAL
DECISIONS [P.L.D.] 1979 Cent. Statutes 51 (Pak.); ASHFAQ BOKHARY, LAW RELATING TO
HUDOOD CASES 162 (1979); The Islamic Criminal Laws, in THE MAJOR ACTS 10 (1992)
[hereinafter MAJOR ACTS].
3. See Zina Ordinance § 1 (stating commencement date); P.L.D. 1979 Cent. Statutes at
51; BOKHARY, supra note 2, at 164; MAJOR ACTS, supra note 2, at 10.
4. This article will not address the rationale or propriety of criminalizing consensual
sexual relations, whether under Islamic law or under the many other penal codes of the world
which criminalize such behavior. Rather, the focus of the present study is the law of
nonconsensual sexual relations laid out in the Zina Ordinance in Pakistan and as addressed in
Islamic jurisprudence.
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Zina is liable to hadd [punishment] if-
(a) it is committed by a man who is an adult and is not insane with
a woman to whom he is not, and does not suspect himself to be
married; or
(b) it is committed by a woman who is an adult and is not insane
with a man to whom she is not, and does not suspect herself to be
married.
Under its heading of zina, the Zina Ordinance includes the category
"zina-bil-jabr" (zina by force) which lays out the definition and punish-
ment for sexual intercourse against the will or without the consent of
one of the parties. The section articulating the crime of rape, as zina-bil-
jabr, states:
A person is said to commit zina-bil-jabr if he or she has sexual
intercourse with a woman or man, as the case may be, to whom he
or she is not validly married, in any of the following circumstanc-
es, namely:-
(a) against the will of the victim,
(b) without the consent of the victim,
(c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been
obtained by putting the victim in fear of death or of hurt, or
(d) with the consent of the victim, when the offender knows that
the offender is not validly married to the victim and that the con-
sent is given because the victim believes that the offender is anoth-
er person to whom the victim is or believes herself or himself to be
validly married.
Explanation.-Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual
intercourse necessary to the offence of zina-bil-jabr.
Zina-bil-jabr is zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd if it is committed in the
circumstances specified [above].6
5. Zina Ordinance §§ 4, 5; P.L.D. 1979 Cent. Statutes at 52; BOKHARY, supra note 2, at
176 (with comment and annotations); MAJOR ACTS, supra note 2, at 11.
6. Zina Ordinance § 6; P.L.D. 1979 Cent. Statutes at 52; BOKHARY, supra note 2, at 182
(with comment and annotations); MAJOR ACTS, supra note 2, at 11-12.
Winter 1997]
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Finally, the Zina Ordinance then specifies the evidence required to prove
both zina and zina-bil-jabr:
Proof of zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd shall be in one of the
following forms, namely:-
(a) the accused makes before a Court of competent jurisdiction a
confession of the commission of the offence; or
(b) at least four Muslim adult male witnesses, about whom the
Court is satisfied, having regard to the requirements of tazkiyah al-
shuhood [credibility of witnesses], that they are truthful persons
and abstain from major sins (kabair), give evidence as eyewitness-
es of the act of penetration necessary to the offence[.f
When this law was enacted in 1977, proponents argued that it codified
the Islamic law of illegal sexual relations. The accuracy of that claim is
addressed in detail later.8 First, it is important to note that the applica-
tion of the Zina Ordinance in Pakistan has placed a new twist and a
renewed urgency on the question of its validity. The twist is this: when
a zina-bil-jabr case fails for lack of four witnesses, the Pakistani legal
system has more than once concluded that the intercourse was therefore
consensual, and consequently has charged rape victims with zina.
A few disturbing cases will illustrate the concern. In 1982, fifteen-
year-old Jehan Mina became pregnant as a result of a reported rape.
Lacking the testimony of four eyewitnesses that the intercourse was in
fact rape, Jehan was convicted of zina on the evidence of her illegiti-
mate pregnancy. 9 Her child was born in prison.'0 Later, a similar case
caused public outcry and drew public attention to the new law. In 1985,
Safia Bibi, a sixteen-year-old nearly blind domestic servant reported that
she was repeatedly raped by her landlord/employer and his son, and
7. Zina Ordinance § 8; P.L.D. 1979 Cent. Statutes at 53; BOKHARY, supra note 2, at 192
(with comment and annotations); MAJOR ACTS, supra note 2, at 12. I have not included the
punishments specified for each crime, as that is not within the focus of this article. Here, I am
primarily concerned with the definition and categorization of each of these offenses. Briefly,
however, the hadd punishment prescribed in the ordinance for a zina offense is either public
stoning or whipping. For a zina-bil-jabr conviction, it prescribes imprisonment and/or fine
and/or public whipping. See Zina Ordinance § 6. See also infra note 25 for citations to
discussions of punishments for zina in Islamic law.
8. See infra Parts l.B., 11.
9. Jehan Mina v. The State, P.L.D. 1983 Fed. Shariat Ct. 183 (Pak.).
10. See Rubya Mehdi, The Offence of Rape in the Islamic Law of Pakistan, 18 INT'L J.
Soc. & L. 19, 26 (1990).
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became pregnant as a result. When she charged the men with rape, the
case was dismissed for lack of evidence, as she was the only witness
against them. Safia, however, being unmarried and pregnant, was
charged with zina and convicted on this evidence."
Short of conviction, women have also been held for extended peri-
ods of time on charges of zina when they allege rape.'2 For example, in
July, 1992, Shamim, a twenty-one-year-old mother of two, charged that
she was kidnaped and raped by three men in Karachi. When a rape
complaint was lodged against the perpetrators, the police instead arrested
Shamim, and charged her with zina when her family could not post the
fee set for her release. The police held her in custody for six days,
during which she reports that she was repeatedly raped by two police
officers and a third unnamed person. 13 Numerous women have reported
similar custodial rapes in Pakistan.
14
Police action and inaction in rape cases in Pakistan have in fact
been widely reported as instrumental elements to the injustice. There is
evidence that police have deliberately failed to file charges against men
accused of rape, often using the threat of converting the rape charge into
a zina prosecution against the female complainant to discourage women
from reporting. 5 And when the perpetrator is a police officer himself,
11. See Safia Bibi v. The State, P.L.D. 1985 Fed. Shariat Ct. 120 (Pak.). She was
sentenced to fifteen lashes, three years imprisonment, and a fine. Public outrage eventually
led the appellate court to set aside the punishment. See RASHIDA PATEL, SOcIO-EcONOMIC
POLITICAL STATUS AND WOMEN AND LAW IN PAKISTAN 25-26 (1991); Ayesha Jalal, The
Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State. in Pakistan, in WOMEN, ISLAM AND THE
STATE 102 (Deniz Kandiyoti ed., 1991); Mehdi, supra note 10, at 19, 24-26; Shahid Reman
Khan, Under Pakistan's Form of Islamic Law, Rape is a Crime-For the Victims, L.A. TIMES,
May 25, 1986, § 1, at 27 (reporting Bibi case, and another similar case).
12. See ASIA WATCH & WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: POLICE ABUSE OF WOMEN IN PAKISTAN 41-60 (1992) [hereinafter DOUBLE
JEOPARDY].
13. See AMNESTY INT'L, PAKISTAN: TORTURE, DEATHS IN CUSTODY AND EXTRAJUDICIAL
EXECUTIONS 11-12 (1993) [hereinafter TORTURE].
14. See DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 12; PATEL, supra note 11, at 36; Mehdi, supra
note 10, at 27 (1990) (citing report by attorney Asma Jahangir of fifteen incidents of police
rape of women in detention in 1988/1989); Seminar, Adultery and Fornication in Islamic
Jurisprudence: Dimensions and Perspectives, 2 ISLAMIC & COMp. L.Q. 267, 286-87 (1982)
(convenor Tahir Mahmoud noting "cases of rape ... in private (including those committed by
policemen) are alarmingly on an increase in the [Indo-Pakistani] subcontinent.").
15. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, PAKISTAN, THE PATTERN PERSISTS: DEATHS IN CUSTODY,
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS, AND "DISAPPEARANCES" UNDER THE PPP GOVERNMENT 35
(1995) [hereinafter PATTERN PERSISTS] (reporting January 17, 1994, gang rape of five women,
stating that police pressured women to report only robbery, and conceal rape); TORTURE,
supra note 13, at 11-12 (citing Shamim case, and similar Imamat Khatoon case). In 1992,
more than 2,000 women were in jail awaiting trial for zina. See DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra
note 12, at 69. Many women are eventually acquitted after enduring long trials. See PATEL,
supra note 11, at 28.
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the chances of pursuing a case against him are nearly nonexistent.
Shahida Parveen faced this very situation when she reported that in July,
1994, two police officers broke into her house and locked her children
in a room while they raped her at gunpoint. A medical examination
confirmed that she was raped by more than one person, but the police
refused to register her complaint. 6
Political rivals have further exploited women by using rape as a
weapon against each other. In November, 1992, Khursheed Begum, the
wife of an arrested member of the Pakistan People's Party was abducted
on her way home from attending her husband's court hearing. She states
that she was blindfolded, driven to a police station, and repeatedly raped
there by police officers, who asserted political motives for the attack. 7
Later that same month, forty-year-old Veena Hayat, a member of one of
Pakistan's elite families and daughter of a prominent politician, stated
that she was gang raped for twelve hours in every room of her house by
five armed men. Despite her father taking the unusual social risk of
publicly reporting the attack, a judicial investigation concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to convict the alleged perpetrators."
Cases such as these, resulting from the unfortunate application of the
Zina Ordinance, are reported widely in the Western media.' 9 The issue is
now a primary topic in women's and human rights discussions globally,2"
16. PATTERN PERSISTS, supra note 15, at 14.
17. AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1992 207 (1992) [hereinafter
1992 REPORT]; Deborah Scroggins, Playing the Power Game with Rape Series: Women of the
Veil, VANCOUVER SUN, July 13, 1992, at AI0, available in 1992 WL 5936212. See also
Ahmed Rashid, Rape Scandal Rocks Pakistan: Ahmed Rashid in Islamabad on a Gang Attack
that is Exposing a Rotten State Machine, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 29, 1991, at 14.
18. See AFIYA SHEHRBANO ZIA, SEX CRIME IN THE ISLAMIC CONTEXT: RAPE, CLASS
AND GENDER IN PAKISTAN 55-57 (1994). See also Asia: Pakistan, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14,
1991, at 43; Rashid, supra note 17, at 14; Melissa Robinson, Unveiled: Rape in Pakistan,
NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1992, at 11.
19. See, e.g., John Branion, Note, Recent Development: A World of Rape, 2 UCLA WOM-
EN'S L.J. 275, 276 (1992); Mary Curtius, Report Blasts Global Abuse of Women's Rights;
'Conflict Zone' Governments Found to be Worst Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 1994, at
2; Mark Fineman, Pakistan Women Fear New Islamic Law May Blunt Struggle for Rights,
L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1988, at pt. 1, 5; Lori Heise, When Women are Prey; Around the World,
Rape is Commonplace-and the Victims Can't Fight Back, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1991, at CI;
Aslam Khan, Zia's "Islamic Democracy": Leading Pakistan into the Past, NATION, June 29,
1985, at 791; Khan, supra, note 11, at 27; O.J. Simpson fits Stereotype: Religious Fundamen-
talism Appears to Breed More Violence Toward Women, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 30, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Rashid, supra, note 17, at 14; Robinson, supra note 18,
at 11; Scroggins, supra, note 17, at A10; Katharine Whitehorn, The Apartheid of Gender,
OBSERVER (London), June 19, 1994, at 23.
20. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1993 1370, 1382 (1994); AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1994
232-33 (1994); AMNESTY INT'L, WOMEN IN PAKISTAN: DISADVANTAGED AND DENIED THEIR
[Vol. 18:287
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and stirs up an expected share of frustration, anger, defensiveness, and
arrogance from all sides. The debate, however, begs the question: What
is the Islamic law of rape? Any real substantive analysis of the zina-bil-
jabr law and its application must first be approached from this frame-
work-the same framework upon which the law purports to base itself.
I will therefore ask the critical question: does Pakistan's Zina Ordinance
accurately articulate the Islamic law of rape?
B. Law of God: the Quran on Zina
The Pakistani Zina Ordinance subsumes rape-as zina-bil-
jabr-under the general zina law of unlawful sexual relations. To analyze
the appropriateness of this categorization, we must first analyze the
Islamic law of zina itself. The preamble of the Pakistani Zina Ordinance
states that it is enacted "to modify the existing law relating to zina so as
to bring it in conformity with the Injunctions of the Holy Quran and
Sunnah.' Indeed, the term zina itself appears in the Quran. In warning
generally against the dangers of adultery, the Quran states:
And do not go near fornication [zina] as it is immoral and an evil
way.
22
Later, the Quran more specifically sets out actual legal prescriptions
criminalizing illegal sexual relations:
The adulteress and adulterer should be flogged a hundred lashes
each, and no pity for them should deter you from the law of God,
RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter DISADVANTAGED]; DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 12, at 53-60;
1992 REPORT, supra note 17, at 207-08; PATEL, supra note 11, at 27-30 (citing activities of
All Pakistan Women's Association, Pakistan Women Lawyers' Association, Pakistan Women's
Rights Committee); PATTERN PERSISTS, supra note 15, at 14, 35; TORTURE, supra note 13, at
10-13; Jalal, supra note 11, at 103-09 (describing activities of Women's Action Forum in
Karachi); Peregrine Hodson, Bhutto Appeals for Reward over Moderate Stand, TIMES (Lon-
don), Nov. 26, 1994, at 16 (quoting Prime Minister Bhutto urging a change of the zina laws);
Anwar Iqbal, Bhutto Seeks Laws Against Rape, U.P.I., Aug. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Upi File; Bushra Jabbar, The Reality of Rape, ECON. REV. (Pak.), July 1991, at
7-8; Beena Sarwar, Pakistan-Women: Bhutto Campaigns Against Domestic Violence, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, July 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
21. Zina Ordinance, Pmbl.; MAJOR ACTS, supra note 2, at 10. "Sunnah" is a term used to
describe the traditions of Prophet Muhammad. See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES
OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 44 (2d ed. 1991).
22. Quran 17:32. Another verse generally urging against fornication states:
Devotees of Ar-Rahman [The Merciful] are those ... who do not invoke any god
apart from God; who do not take a life which God has forbidden except for a cause
that is just, and do not fornicate [zinal-and any one who does so will be punished
for the crime.
Id. at 25:63, 68. Note that all English renditions of the Quranic verses cited in this article come
from the Ahmed Ali translation, published as AI-Qur'an (Ahmed Ali trans., 1984).
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if you believe in God and the Last Day; and the punishment should
be witnessed by a body of believers.23
Following this definition of the offense are extremely strict evidentiary
rules for the proof of such a crime:
Those who defame chaste women and do not bring four witnesses
should be punished with eighty lashes, and their testimony should
not be accepted afterwards, for they are profligates.
Thus, after criminalizing extramarital sexual relations,25 the Quran
simultaneously attaches to the prosecution of this crime nearly insur-
mountable evidentiary restrictions: four eyewitnesses are required to
prove a charge of sexual misconduct.
26
23. Id. at 24:2.
24. Id. at 24:4. The verse goes on to specify a relaxed evidentiary standard between
spouses, understandable given the personal nature such an accusation would have on the
marital relationship:
Those who accuse their wives and do not have any witnesses except themselves,
should swear four times in the name of God, the testimony of each such person
being that he is speaking the truth.
And (swear) a fifth time that if he tell a lie, the curse of God be on him.
The woman's punishment can be averted if she swears four times by God as
testimony that her husband is a liar.
Her fifth oath being that the curse of God be on her if her husband should be
speaking the truth.
Id. at 24:6-9. For further discussion of this spousal zina situation, see 'ABDUR RAHMAN I. Doi,
WOMEN IN Shari'ah (ISLAMIC LAW) 126-28 (1989); KAMALI, supra note 21, at 156; AL-IMAM
MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS AL-SHAFI'I, AL-RISALA [TREATISE ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE] 146-47 (Majid Khadduri trans., 2d ed. 1987). Note that here, there is no
discrepancy in weight of testimony based on the gender of the party, because in a charge of
adultery between spouses, a woman's word is equal to that of a man.
25. As noted earlier, this article does not address the punishments prescribed for the crime
of zina. See supra note 7. Interestingly, the answer is not as concrete as these verses might
imply. Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad involving the stoning of adulterers have created
much debate among Islamic jurists regarding the role of the death penalty and corporal
punishment in zina sentencing. See, e.g., SAYED HASSAN AMIN, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE CONTEM-
PORARY WORLD 27-28 (1985) (citing a 1981 Pakistan Shari'ah (Islamic law) Court ruling that
stoning for adultery is not correct Islamic practice); BOKHARY, supra note 2, at 181 (citing
legal debate in Pakistan over propriety of stoning as punishment for adultery). The focus of
this study, however, is limited to the definition of the crime itself, and the categorization of
rape as zina. The topic of what punishment the state should inflict upon those convicted of
such a crime must wait for another day.
26. See Doi, supra note 1, at 236-40 (summarizing crime of zina); Dol, supra note 24,
at 117-28 (summarizing crime of zina); MOHAMED S. EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW
13-15 (1982) (general discussion of zina law as laid down in Quranic verses). The "proof of
zina" section of the Zina Ordinance, which also requires four witnesses, comes to mind. Thus,
in setting zina as a crime in Pakistani law, and requiring four witnesses as necessary proof of
[Vol. 18:287
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Islamic jurisprudence further interprets the Quranic zina evidentiary
rule of quadruple testimony to require the actual witnessing of pene-
tration during sexual intercourse, and nothing less.27 This interpretation
is based on the reported hadith (tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad in
which, after a man persisted in confessing to adultery (the Prophet
having turned away to avoid hearing the information several times prior),
Muhammad asked several specific questions to confirm that the act was
indeed sexual penetration. 8 Moreover, Islamic evidence law requires the
witnesses to be mature, sane, and of upright character. 29 Furthermore, if
any eyewitness testimony was obtained by violating a defendant's
privacy, it is inadmissible.3" And, lastly, the Hedaya, a key reference of
Hanafi jurisprudence3' prominent in Muslim India,32 even sets a statute of
limitations for charging zina.33
such a crime, the Ordinance does in fact appear to be based, at least in structure, on Islamic
law. However, as discussed in the following sections, the details of the Zina Ordinance, and
especially its subcategorization of rape as a type of zina is not Islamic law.
27. See NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 127 (1994); Doi, supra note 24,
at 122; MUHAMMAD IQBAL SIDDIQI, THE PENAL LAW OF ISLAM 69 (2d ed. 1985); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law, and the Protection of Human Rights in the Islamic
Criminal Justice System, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1982) (citing the rule of thumb that a hypothetical thread must not have been able to pass
through the two bodies); Seminar, supra note 14, at 271.
28. See 8 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, Bk. 82, Nos. 806, 810, 812-814, at 528-35 (Muhammad
Muhsin Khan trans., 1985) [hereinafter AL-BUKHARI], 3 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, -Nos.
4413-4414 (Ahmad Hasan trans., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter ABU DAWUD]. It is interesting to
note that although the man was punished based on his confession, the woman was apparently
never prosecuted or even investigated. The significance of this point will be apparent later, in
the discussion of the context of the Quranic verses on zina, and their impact on women's
privacy. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
29. See Ma'amoun M. Salama, General Principles of Criminal Evidence In Islamic
Jurisprudence, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 109, 116-20. See
also EL-AWA, supra note 26, at 126-27; SIDDIQI, supra note 27, at 43-49.
30. See Osman Abd-el-Malek al-Saleh, The Right of the Individual to Personal Security
in Islam, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 55, 69-70 (citing an
incident where the Caliph Omar ibn al Khattab and a companion passed a party in which,
behind locked doors, individuals were drinking alcohol; because of Islamic injunctions against
spying, the two disregarded the private party and returned home). See also SIDDIQI, supra note
27, at 19-20 (citing requirement to knock before entering a residence, even of family). But see
THE HEDAYA OR GUIDE: A COMMENTARY ON THE MUSSULMAN LAWS, Bk. VII, Ch. III, at 194
(Charles Hamilton trans., 1982) (allowing evidence unlawfully obtained) [hereinafter HEDAYA].
31. See infra note 53 for an explanation of the Islamic schools of law.
32. See SOBHI MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI FI AL-ISLAM [THE PHILOSOPHY OF
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM] 23, 49 (Farhat J. Ziadeh trans., 1987), for history and significance
of the HEDAYA.
33. HEDAYA, supra note 30, Bk. VII, Ch. II, at 188. This statute of limitations, signifi-
cantly, does not apply to a charge of slander. Id. In addition to the above restrictions, where
a zina conviction is a result of confession rather than testimony, the confession may be
retracted at any time (including during execution of the sentence). See Salama, supra note 30,
at 120.
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Why so many evidentiary restrictions on a criminal offense pre-
scribed by God? Islamic scholars posit that it is precisely to prevent
carrying out punishment for this offense. By limiting conviction to only
those cases where four individuals actually saw sexual penetration take
place, the crime will realistically only be punishable if the two parties are
committing the act in public, in the nude. The crime is therefore really
one of public indecency rather than private sexual conduct.34 That is,
even if four witnesses saw a couple having sex, but under a coverlet, for
example, this testimony would not only fail to support a zina charge, but
these witnesses would also be liable for slander.35 Thus, while the Quran
condemns extramarital sex as an evil, it authorizes the Muslim legal
system to prosecute someone for committing this crime only when the
act is performed so openly that four people see them without invading
their privacy. As Cherif Bassiouni states, "[tihe requirement of proof and
its exigencies lead to the conclusion that the policy of the harsh penalty
is to deter public aspects of this form of sexual practice. 36
This analysis is consistent with the tone of the Quranic verses which
immediately follow the above verses regarding zina. After the verses
establishing the crime and the attendant standard of proof, the Quran
states:
Those who spread lies were a clique among you. Do not think it
was bad for you: In fact it has been good for you. Each of them
will pay for the sin he has committed, and he who had greater share
(of guilt) will suffer grievous punishment.
Why did the faithful men and women not think well of their people
when they heard this, and [say] "This is a clear lie?"
Why did they not bring four witnesses (in support of their charge)?
And since they did not bring the four witnesses, they are themselves
liars in the sight of God.
34. See Salama, supra note 29, at 118, n.* ("[tihe nature of such rigorous proof makes it
a crime of public indecency rather than adultery.").
35. See Quran 24:4 (stating that those who charge women with zina and do not have four
witnesses should be given eighty lashes and their testimony should not be accepted thereafter).
See also 13 THE HISTORY OF AL-TABARI 110-14 (Gautier H. A. Juynboll trans., 1989)
(describing incident where Caliph Umar punished witnesses supporting zina charge against al-
Mughirah b. Shu'bah, Governor of Basra, because of conflicting details in their testimony of
eyewitnessed act).
36. Bassiouni, supra note 27, at 6. See also EL-AWA, supra note 26, at 17 ("The desire
to protect public morality and to safeguard it against corruption by publicizing the offense, is
the reason for limiting the methods of proof."); EL-AWA, supra note 26, at 20 ("This punish-
ment is prescribed in fact for those who committed the crime openly ... with no consideration
for the law or for the feeling of the community," quoting MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA SHALABI, AL-
FIQH AL-ISLAMI BAYN AL-MITHALIYA AL-WAQI'YA 201 (1960)).
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Were it not for the grace of God and His mercy upon you in this
world and the next, you would have suffered a great affliction for
the false accusation.
When you talked about it and said what you did not know, and took
it lightly-though in the sight of God it was serious-
Why did you not say when you heard it: "It is not for us to speak
of it? God preserve us, it is a great calumny!"
God counsels you not to do a thing like this, if you are believers.37
The Quran's call to respond to charges of sexual misconduct with "it is
not for us to speak of it" echoes the hadith in which the Prophet Mu-
hammad was reluctant to take even a man's confession of adultery.38 The
Quran contemplates a society in which one does not engage in publiciz-
ing others' sexual indiscretions. Quranic principles honor privacy and
dignity over the violation of law, except when a violation becomes a
matter of public indecency.
Placing these Quranic verses into context will further emphasize the
importance of this concept in Islamic law, and in particular, its close
connection to the dignity of women. The verses setting forth the crime of
zina and the accompanying verses denouncing public discussion of the
matter were revealed just after the famous "Affair of the Necklace," in
which the Prophet Muhammad's wife, Aisha, was mistakenly left behind
by a caravan in the desert when she went looking for a lost necklace.39
She returned home with a young single man who had happened upon her
and given her a ride home. Rumors of Aisha's time alone with this man
spread quickly throughout the small town of Medina, until the above
verses finally ended the gossip. Thus, the very revelation of these verses
was prompted by an incident involving attacks on a woman's digni-
ty-Aisha's honor. Indeed, the verse setting forth severe punishment for
slander is directed specifically against charges impugning a woman's
chastity: "Those who defame chaste women, and do not bring four
37. Quran 24:11-17.
38. See supra text accompanying note 28.
39. See 18 AL-TABARI, JAMC' AL-BAYAN 'AN TA'WIL AY AL-QUR'AN 86-101 (1910), cited
in D.A. SPELLBERG, POLITICS, GENDER, AND THE ISLAMIC PAST: THE LEGACY OF 'AISHA BINT
ABi BAKR 82 (1994); 2 AKRAM DIYA AL 'UMARI, MADINAN SOCIETY AT THE TIME OF THE
PROPHET 82-84 (Huda Khattab trans., 1991). Note that this is a primarily Sunni account of the
context of these verses. Many Shii scholars do not attribute these verses to the "Affair of the
Necklace" incident. SPELLBERG, supra, at 81-82 (citing Shii author al-Qummi, but also noting
Shii author al-Tabarsi, who took the Sunni position).
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witnesses, should be punished with eighty lashes, and their testimony
should not be accepted afterwards .... ,,' Men do not seem to be of
particular concern here.
Why the focus on women? Looking at the issue-from a cultural
perspective, this focus is not surprising. In nearly every culture of the
world, women's sexual morality appears to be a particularly favorite
subject for slander, gossip, and insult."' The tendency of patriarchal
societies, in fact, is to view a woman's chastity as central to the honor of
her family, especially the men in her family. For example, under British
common law (the law in Pakistan before the Hudood Ordinance), rape
was a crime punishable against men, to be lodged by the husband of the
woman raped against the man who violated her. 2 The woman's place
was apparently on the sidelines of a prosecution by her husband against
her rapist.
This cultural phenomenon-that a family's honor lies in the virtue of
its women-exists in many countries today; Pakistan is one of them.
Studies indicate that in Pakistan, when women are jailed for long periods
of time on charges of zina, their families and friends are reluctant to help
or even visit them, "as accusation of zina is a serious dishonour. ' '43 Even
more disturbing, suicide is perceived as the honorable solution to the
humiliation, especially when sexual violation is involved. For example,
when. Khursheed Begum was raped in 1992, 44 her husband and son
"wish[ed] she had committed suicide," even after human rights activists
explained to them that the rape was not her fault. 45 This attitude lends
40. Quran 24:4 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE (1980) (discussing the asymmetry
of language, and insults that tend to be based on women's sexuality).
42. See MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 637-39 (1778). See
also RUBYA MEHDI, THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE LAW IN PAKISTAN 116, § 3.3.1 (1994) (stating
that before the Hudood ordinances, the penal law of Pakistan included adultery as an offense,
but defined it as intercourse by a man with the wife of another without his permission; women
were not punished even as abettors); ZIA, supra note 18, at 25-26 (stating that under the pre-
Hudood criminal legal system inherited from the British, a complaint of adultery could only
be lodged by the husband); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference
Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1782
(1992) ("Until the twentieth century, . .. female sexual autonomy had little to do with the law
of rape. The law instead struck a balance between the interests of males-in-possession and their
predatory counterparts."). The Pakistani Penal Code prior to 1979 borrowed from this English
common -law of rape. See PAK. PENAL CODE § 375 (1860) (repealed 1979), reprinted in R.A.
NELSON, THE PAKISTAN PENAL CODE 2109-10 (1975) (legislating and elaborating on rape
defined as "the ravishment of a woman without her consent, by force, fear, or fraud," citing
English common law precedent).
43. PATEL, supra note 11, at 27.
44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
45. Scroggins, supra note 17.
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itself easily to manipulation and the development of a tribal attitude
where women's bodies become tools for revenge by men against men.
Indeed, increasingly in Pakistan, "[in cases of revenge against the male
members of [a] family, instances have come to light where their women
are violated." 46 Even within a family, physically harming (even killing)
women for alleged infidelity or some other embarrassment to the fami-
ly-often by some sort of burning-is an unfortunate tradition in the
Indo-Pakistani subcontinent.47 And, as world human rights organizations
have documented, '"honor killings" of women suspected of sexual indis-
cretion, carried out by a male family member, are unfortunately not
limited to this part of the world.48
The Quran, however, has harsh words for the exploitation of wom-
en's dignity in this way. As if anticipating the misogynistic tendency of
society, the Quran first establishes that there is to be no speculation
about a woman's sexual conduct. No one may cast any doubt upon the
character of a woman except by formal charges, with very specific,
secure evidence (i.e. four eyewitnesses to actual intercourse) that the
woman is disrupting public decency with her behavior.49 If such direct
proof does not materialize, then anyone engaging in such a charge is
subject to physical punishment for slander. (For even if the information
is true, any witness who is not accompanied by another three will be
punished for slander).5° As for the public at large, they must leave her
alone, regardless of the outcome. Where the public refuses to perpetuate
rumors, responding instead that: "it is not for us to speak of,"51 the patri-
archal tendency to invest the honor of society in women's sexuality loses
force. In the face of any hint of a woman's sexual impropriety, the
Quranic response is: walk away. Leave her alone. Leave her dignity
intact. The honor of a woman is not a tool, it is her fundamental right.
46. PATEL, supra note 11, at 36. See also ZIA, supra note 18, at 30 ("The motivation of
feudal enmity, revenge for honour via the sexuality of the woman, collusion of male authorities
in attributing all blame on the woman, and State sanctioning of control over women even in
the extreme form of murder, are all feeding impulses in most sex crimes [in Pakistan].");
Shahla Haeri, The Politics of Dishonor: Rape and Power in Pakistan, in FAITH AND FREEDOM:
WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 161 (Mahnaz Afkhami ed., 1995) (arguing
that "political rape" is a modern version of" 'feudal' 'honor rape' "); Sarwar, supra note 20
("Women are also considered property, and the repositories of male honor. If a man wants
revenge from someone, the surest way is to strike at him through his 'honor'-his wife or
daughter.").
47. DISADVANTAGED, supra note 20, at 3 (reporting burnings); Sarwar, supra note 20 ("In
addition, Pakistani society tacitly condones 'honor killings'-the murder of a female relative
on suspicion of 'illicit relations.' ").
48. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS ARE WOMEN'S RIGHTS 92 (1995) (discuss-
ing honor killings in Egypt and Iraq).
49. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 37.
51. See Quran 24:16-17; supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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1. Pregnancy as Proof of Zina?
Given the Quran's strict standard of proof for a zina case, one might
now wonder whether the conviction of women like Jehan Mina and Safia
Bibi for zina on the evidence of their pregnancy alone 52 could be justi-
fied by Islamic law. In traditional Islamic jurisprudence, the majority
opinion53 is that pregnancy alone is not sufficient evidence to prove zina,
since the Quran specifies nothing less than four eyewitnesses, and a
fundamental principle of Islamic criminal procedure is that the benefit of
the doubt lies with the accused.54 Other Muslim scholars, however, have
held that pregnancy does amount to proof of illegal sexual relations,
where the woman is unmarried and has not claimed rape. Imam Malik,
and reportedly Ahmad ibn Hanbal, for example, considered unmarried
pregnancy prima facie evidence of zina.55 This opinion is based in large
part upon the reported positions of the three famous caliphs, Umar ibn
al-Khattab, 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, that "[a]dultery
is public when pregnancy appears or confession is made. ''56 The differ-
ence of opinion is also due to differing interpretations of the role of
circumstantial evidence in hudood cases.57
52. See supra notes 9, 11, and accompanying text.
53. Islamic jurisprudence was developed by jurists whose approaches to and interpreta-
tions of the Quran and Sunnah became varying schools of Islamic law. See MAHMASSANI,
supra note 34, at 15-17. Today, five schools are commonly discussed: the four Sunni schools
(Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali) and the Shii school (Ja'fari). For more information and
background, see id. at 15-39.
54. See 8 MUHAMMAD IBN QUDDAMAH AL-MAQDISI, AL-MUGHNI 'ALA MUKHTASAR AL-
KHARAQI 129, 145 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 1994) (1994) (stating Hanafi and Shafii schools
of thought hold that pregnancy alone does not constitute sufficient evidence for punishment of
zina, but noting that the Maliki school of thought presumes punishment unless there are signs
of coercion) [hereinafter AL-MUGHNI]; SIDDIQI, supra note 27, at 71 (but citing Umar's
reported position that pregnancy furnishes sufficient proof of zina against unmarried woman);
Seminar, supra note 14, at 271 (stating that majority of jurists hold that pregnancy is not prima
facie evidence of zina).
55. See IMAM MALIK, AL-MUWATTA, § 41.4, at 392 ('A'isha 'Abdarahman at-Tarjumana
& Ya'qub Johnson trans., 1982) (stating that an unmarried pregnant woman who claims that
she was forced to have sex is liable for punishment unless she can prove her claim); Salama,
supra note 29, at 121. See also COULSON, supra note 27, at 174-75 (stating that Malikis held
pregnancy as prima facie evidence of zina); EL-AWA, supra note 26, at 130-31 ("[T]he
offence of zina may be proved against an unmarried woman if she is pregnant," citing Maliki
jurists who considered circumstantial evidence important and admissible as proof).
56. Salama, supra note 29, at 121. See also 3 ABU DAWUD, supra note 28, No. 4404
(quoting Umar ibn al-Khattab's statement that fornication exists "when proof is established or
if there is pregnancy, or a confession"); 8 AL-BUKHARI, supra note 28, Bk. 82, No. 816, at
536-37.
57. Salama, supra note 29, at 120-21 (summarizing role of qara'in (presumptions, or
circumstantial evidence) in hadd jurisprudence).
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The rationale that "adultery is public with pregnancy" is clearly
problematic. Although the rationale does incorporate the concept that the
real criminality in zina is the public display of adultery, it fails to con-
template the potential discrimination against and harming of women. As
a practical evidentiary matter, this perspective does not take into account
modem medical advances such as artificial insemination which might be
alternative explanations for the pregnancy, not to mention pure force.
More substantively, though, it unfairly shifts the burden of proof against
women. Forced to prove that the intercourse was nonconsensual in order
to avoid a zina prosecution, a woman is automatically put in the position
of defending her honor against accusations which do not meet the
Quranic four-witness requirement. This unfairness is not supported by the
spirit of the Quranic verses which discourage presumptions about a
woman's sexual activity by insisting that no presumptions be made
without four witnesses to the actual act. 8 This shift in the burden of
proof is even more patently unfair when the pregnant woman is a victim
of rape. In that instance, an unmarried pregnant woman must overcome
the burden of a prima facie case against her simply because the attack
has resulted in pregnancy.
Moreover, the Quranic insistence on four witnesses, as we saw
earlier, establishes that the act of intercourse must be public, not its
consequences.59 It is public sex which is deterred, not public pregnancy.
A pregnant woman looks the same in public, whether the pregnancy
occurred from rape, zina, or legal marital intercourse, and in modern
societies with large populations, it is generally not obvious which of
these three applies to a pregnant woman on the street. Nor, indeed,
should the public (or courts) speculate without solid eyewitness proof of
the actual act of penetration, according to Islamic law. Furthermore,
pregnancy is something which only applies to women. If pregnancy alone
constitutes sufficient evidence of zina, the result seems to forget that the
very purpose of the zina verses is to protect women's honor. Women,
again, tend to be more susceptible to accusation, and the Quran addresses
this susceptibility by directly, enjoining any charges against women
without solid proof.6° If pregnancy is allowed as sufficient proof of zina,
a pregnant adulteress will be convicted without any testimonial proof,
while her adulterous partner escapes punishment with his reputation
intact. The woman-affirming spirit of the zina verses is lost.
58. See supra Part I.B.
59. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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C. Drafting Problems in the Zina Ordinance
1. The Same Brush: Why Rape as a Form of Zina?'
As we have seen, the Quranic verses regarding zina do not address
the concept of nonconsensual sex. This omission is a logical one. The
zina verses establish a crime of public sexual indecency. Rape, on the
other hand, is a very different crime. Rape is an inherently reprehensible
act which society has an interest in preventing, whether or not it is
committed in public. Therefore, rape does not logically belong as a
subset of the public indecency crime of zina. Unfortunately, however, the
Zina Ordinance is written exactly counter to this Quranic omission and
it includes zina-bil-jabr (zina by force) as a subcategory of the crime of
zina.
61
Where did the zina-bil-jabr section in the Ordinance come from then,
if it is not part of the Quranic law of zina? We will see later that in
Islamic jurisprudence addressing zina, there is significant discussion of
whether there is liability for zina under duress.62 But the language of the
zina-bil-jabr section in the Pakistani Ordinance does not appear to be
drawn from these discussions. (That is, it is not presented as an exception
to zina in the case of duress). Rather, the zina-bil-jabr language is nearly
identical to the old common law of rape in Pakistan, the borrowed
British criminal law in force in Pakistan before the Hudood ordinances.
The old common law Pakistani rape statute read:
A man is said to commit "rape" who, except in the cases hereinafter
excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances
falling under any of the following descriptions:-
First.-Against her will.
Secondly.-Without her consent.
Thirdly.-With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by
putting her in fear of death, or of hurt.
Fourthly.-With her consent when the man knows that he is not her
husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he
is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully
married.
Fifthly.-With or without her consent, when she is under [fourteen].
years of age.
61. See supra note 5-6 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Part II.A.
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Explanation.-Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual inter-
course necessary to the offence of rape.
Exception.-Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the
wife not being under [thirteen] years of age is not rape.63
With the exception of the statutory rape section (under "Fifthly"), the
language specifying what constitutes rape is almost identical to the zina-
bil-jabr language under the Hudood ordinance. Even the explanation that
penetration is sufficient to constitute the necessary intercourse is the
same. Did the Pakistani legislators, in writing the zina-bil-jabr law,
simply relabel the old secular law of rape under the Muslim heading of
zina (as zina by force-jabr), and re-enact it as part of the Hudood
Islamization of Pakistan's laws-right along with the four-witness
evidentiary rule unique to zina? If so, this cut-and-paste job, albeit a
well-intentioned effort to retain rape as a crime in Pakistan's new
Hudood criminal code, reveals a limited view of Islamic criminal law
which, as illustrated, ultimately harms women.
2. Sexuality and Suspicion
Rape law in the United States has long reflected cultural patriarchal
assumptions about female sexuality and consent. A frequent casualty in
rape trials is the rape victim's reputation, as the court attempts to sort out
the issue of consent. 64 This problem is exacerbated in Pakistan because
63. PAK. PENAL CODE § 375 (1860) (repealed 1979), reprinted in NELSON, supra note 42,
at 2109-10 (1975). For comparison, the zina-bil-jabr section reads:
A person is said to commit zina-bil-jabr if he or she has sexual intercourse with a
woman or man, as the case may be, to whom he or she is not validly married, in
any of the following circumstances, namely:-
(a) against the will of the victim,
(b) without the consent of the victim,
(c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been obtained by putting
the victim in fear of death or of hurt, or
(d) with the consent of the victim, when the offender knows that the offender is not
validly married to the victim and that the consent is given because the victim
believes that the offender is another person to whom the victim is or believes herself
or himself to be validly married.
Explanation.-Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary
to the offence of 'zina-bil-jabr.'
Zina Ordinance § 6; P.L.D. 1979 Cent. Statutes at 52; BOKHARY, supra note 3, at 182 (with
comment and annotations); MAJOR ACTS, supra note 2, at 11 -12.
64. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 42.
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the convoluted placement of rape as part of the Zina Ordinance encour-
ages the use of a woman's unsuccessful claim of rape as some sort of
default evidence of zina. Thus, there is a strong tendency to suspect any
charge of rape to be a "loose woman's" attempt to escape punishment for
zina. Female sexual stereotypes dangerously fuel these cases. For exam-
ple, on appeal of one rape conviction, the Pakistani Federal Shariat Court
stated:
[W]herever resort to courts is unavoidable for any reason, a general
possibility that even though the girl was a willing party to the
occurrence, it would hardly be admitted or conceded. In fact it is
not uncommon that a woman, who was a willing party, acts as a
ravished woman, if she is surprised when in amorous courtship,
love-making or in the embrace of a man she has not repulsed.65
Such biased and derogatory observations against women by the Islamic
court in Pakistan reveal a basic cultural male bias in the perception of
women and female sexuality.
This bias also manifests itself in conclusions that a given sexual
encounter must have been consensual if there is no physical evidence of
resistance by the woman (another issue familiar to rape law reformers in
the West). Many Pakistani judgments of rape have been converted into
zina cases because of the absence of evidence of such resistance.66 This
stereotypical concept of women supposes that if a woman does not
struggle against a sexual assault, then she must be a sexually loose
woman-justifying a conversion of the charge to zina. This attitude
unfairly generalizes human reaction to force and the threat of violence.
And, this generalization works to the detriment of women who have been
subjected to a rapist's attack and survived only by submitting without
physical resistance.
Ironically, this is the exact type of speculation regarding women's
sexual activity which the Quran explicitly condemns in the very verses
establishing the crime of zina.67 Judicial and societal speculation about
women's sexual looseness clearly does not correspond with the Quranic
admonition that "it is not for us to speak of." The intertwining of rape
65. See ZIA, supra note 18, at 29 (quoting Federal Shariat Court); Nausheen Ahmad, The
Other Viewpoint, DAWN (Karachi, Pak.), Nov. 14-20, 1995, at 8 (weekly Tuesday Review
supplement) (citing case of alleged rape of fifteen-year-old girl where defendant was acquitted
and court described victim as girl of "loose character" who "has a habitual case of enjoying
sexual intercourse," reported at P.L.D. 1982 Fed. Shariat Ct. 241 (Pak.)).
66. See Hina Jilani, Whose Laws?: Human Rights and Violence Against Women in
Pakistan, in FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE; WOMEN'S STRATEGIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 63,
72 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1992).
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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with zina in Pakistan's Zina Ordinance, however, encourages such
speculation. Rather than constituting a separate violent crime against
women, rape-under the title zina-bil-jabr-is perceived more as a
woman's expected defense to a zina charge, and thus subject to judicial
speculation.
68
3. Bearing Witness: Exclusively Male Testimony
We have reviewed the strict Quranic quadruple testimony standard of
proof for zina cases, and Islamic evidence law regarding the nature of the
testimony requiring upright, sane witnesses, and testimony obtained
without violation of privacy.69 The Zina Ordinance of Pakistan, however,
adds a limitation on the admissibility of evidence which we have not yet
addressed: the witnesses must all be men. 70 That is, the standard of proof
in the Zina Ordinance for zina or zina-bil-jabr is either confession or
testimony by "at least four Muslim adult male witnesses. ' '71
However, the Quranic zina verse setting forth the original four-wit-
ness requirement is not exclusive to men.72 This verse refers to these four
witnesses with the Arabic masculine plural, "shuhada" (witnesses), which
grammatically includes both men and women, unless otherwise indicat-
ed.73 The inclusion of the word "male" in the Zina Ordinance thus
prompts the question: was this interpretation taken from Islamic law or
is it a Pakistani cultural gloss on the rule?
Despite the Quranic use of the plural noun inclusive to both men and
women, many Islamic jurists and scholars have traditionally limited the
four witnesses in a zina case to men.74 In fact, all major schools of
thought have adopted restrictive interpretations of women's ability to
testify as witnesses in general, although some (significantly including the
68. See Jilani, supra note 66, at 71 ("The offense of rape (zina-bil-jabr) is also dealt with
by the same law [of zina]. The effect of this is that rape has become more of a defense against
prosecution for adultery or fornication, rather than being considered as an independent
crime.").
69. See supra Part I.B.
70. Apparently, the exclusion of female evidence was challenged through a petition in the
Federal Shariat Court, but the male only witness requirement still exists in the Ordinance. See
MEHDI, supra note 42, at 118.
71. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
72. See supra text accompanying note 24 (Quran 24:4 "Those who defame chaste women
and do not bring four witnesses [shuhada'] should be punished .... ).
73. See AMINA WADUD-MUHSIN, QURAN AND WOMAN, Ch. 1 (1992) (discussing Quranic
grammar and its emphasis on the duality of men and women).
74. A.D. AJIJOLA, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 134 (2d ed. 1981); EL-AwA, supra
note 26, at 17, 124-26 (defining zina witnesses as four adult men).
Winter 1997]
Michigan Journal of International Law
famous jurists, al-Tabari, Ibn Taymiyya, and Ibn al-Qayyim) have
disagreed.75 The rationales accompanying this rule are interesting, how-
ever. For example, the Hedaya states:
Evidence is of several kinds, that of four men, as has been ordained
in the Quran; and the testimony of a woman in such case is not
admitted; because . . . 'in the time of the Prophet and his two
immediate successors it was an invariable rule to exclude the
evidence of women in all cases inducing punishment or retaliation';
and also because the testimony of women involves a degree of
doubt, as it is merely a substitute for evidence, being accepted only
where the testimony of men cannot be had; and therefore it is not
admitted in any matter liable to drop from the existence of doubt.76
Although the principle that reasonable doubt should negate convictions
of violent crimes is a laudable one, the reasoning leading to it appears to
stem from a condescending patriarchal view of women.77 This attitude
continues even in more modem texts on Islamic law:
In the case of [zina] the testimony of four male witnesses is re-
quired as a female is weak in character.78
[T]he concern of Islamic law for complete truthfulness of evidence
and certainty of proof is abundantly clear from its rules of evidence.
Avoiding conviction only on a single witness testimony and reluc-
tance to act upon the evidence of women only are indications of the
fool-proof system of guilt-determination prescribed by the Qur'an
and Sunna[h].79
75. See Mohammad Fadel, Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power, and Gender in
Medieval Sunni Legal Thought, 29 INT'L. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. (forthcoming May 1997)
(discussing Islamic jurisprudence on women as witnesses, addressing sociological influences
on the restrictions on women's testimony, noting alternative interpretations among jurists);
Salama, supra note 29, at 118 ("All jurists reject the testimony of women," but citing some
scholars who accept testimony of women in zina cases if there are two women for each man).
See also COULSON, supra note 27, at 127; EL-AWA, supra note 26, at 17, 124-26 (defining
zina witnesses as four adult men).
76. HEDAYA, supra note 30, Bk. XXI, Ch. I, at 353-54.
77. Traditional Muslim jurists have used similar biased reasoning to justify the require-
ment of two women witnesses for one man in general non-zina evidence law. These include:
aiding male pride, since the losing party's resentment will be greater if losing to a woman, and
protection of society, as the practice of women leaving the home will lead to social disorder
and corruption. See Fadel, supra note 75.
78. AJIJOLA supra note 74, at 134.
79. N.R. Madhava Menon, Islamic Criminal Jurisprudence and Social Defence [sic.] in
the Modern World: An Appreciation, I ISLAMIC & COMP. L.Q. 232, 237 (1981).
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[I]t is to be observed that the evidence of women against men is not
admissible in wine drinking [prosecutions] because the evidence of
females is liable to variation, and they may also be suspected of
absence of mind, or forgetfulness."0
[Regarding property cases, where two witnesses are required,"1 ]
[t]he Imam al-Shafi'i has said that the evidence of one man and two
women cannot be admitted, excepting in cases that relate to proper-
ty, or its dependencies, such as hire, bail, and so forth, because the
evidence of (a) woman is originally inadmissible on account of their
weakness of understanding, their want of memory and incapacity of
governing, whence it is that their evidence is not admitted in crimi-
nal cases.8 2
[In property cases, where two witnesses are required and the evi-
dence of two women is admissible in place of two men,] [tihe
evidence of four women alone, however, is not accepted, contrary
to what analogy would suggest, because if it were, there would be
frequent occasions for their appearance in public, in order to give
evidence; whereas their privacy is the most laudable. 3
Assumptions such as these of the lack of memory, incompetence, and
general weak character of all women stems from a patriarchal perspective
in a male-dominated intellectual community. The Quran, however, does
not bear this attitude, as it establishes the equality of men and women
before God and the responsibility of both equally as vicegerents of God
on earth.84 But where cultures are male-dominated, the absence of the
active and intelligent participation of women in the public sphere natural-
ly might breed such attitudes, and these have apparently made their way
80. SIDDIQI, supra note 27, at 119.
81. See WADUD-MUHSIN, supra note 73, at 87, for an alternative analysis of Quranic
requirement of two women witnesses for one man, in two-witness-minimum cases.
82. SIDDIQI, supra note 27, at 45.
83. HEDAYA, supra note 30, Bk. XXI, Ch. I, at 354. Similar patriarchal attitudes towards
women manifest themselves even outside discussions of competent witnesses. One modern
commentator rationalizes the disparity between husband and wife in ease of obtaining a
divorce by saying that, because of emotional instability due to the menstrual cycle, "[i]f
women were given the power of unilateral divorce, it is probable that millions of them would
divorce their husbands and it is probable that millions of divorces would have ensued and there
would be chaos in society." Dol, supra note 24, at 95. See also WADUD-MUHSIN, supra note
73, at 35 (citing Zamakhshari's statement that men are preferred by God over women in terms
of "intelligence, physical constitution, determination and physical strength").
84. See WADUD-MUHSIN, supra note 73, at 34-38, 64-66 (describing equality of women
and men laid out in the Quran; distinctions between humans are only on the basis of character,
and women are not defined by biology alone).
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into the analysis and application of Islamic law in such societies and
places in history.
Educated Muslims today, however, would quickly dismiss as simple
ignorance any claims that women are inferior in intellectual capacity,
memory, or character. As for the societal harmony arguments that
women do not venture out into public space, Muslim women today do
not necessarily fit into the mold described in these quotes. Nor, indeed,
did all women of Muslim history.85 To reason that women should not be
witnesses to a zina or zina-bil-jabr case because this would encourage
their going out in public is pointless in a society where, for example, the
medical evidence in a zina prosecution might easily be submitted by a
woman doctor, the prosecuting or defense attorney could be a female
litigator, and the presiding judge a woman jurist. The caution against
women entering public space has long been dropped in most parts of
Pakistan, and in other countries of the modem world.
The limitation of testimony exclusively to men appears to be an
incorporation into Islamic law of an antiquated custom which has now
changed, and in Islamic law, "all rules in the shari'ah [Islamic law] that
are based upon customs change when customs change. 86 Modem
Islamist writings, in fact, have been instrumental in establishing that such
exclusion of women from public space is an unfair cultural practice that
is not an inherent part of Islam:
In the 1970s, some Islamists began a serious reexamination of the
dominant conservative position. They concluded that the inclusion
of women in all facets of the political process was entirely consis-
tent with Islam, that Islam does not require strict segregation of the
sexes, and that much of the conservative position was based on
custom rather than on the absolute principles of Islam.87
85. See IBN HAJJAR AL ASQALANI, AL ISABA FI TAMYIZ AL SAHABA 341-42 (1907)
(discussing Laila al-Shifa bint Abdullah, who was appointed by Caliph Umar to oversee the
Medina marketplace); 2 UMAR KAHHALA, A'LAM AL-NISA 300-01 (10th ed. 1991) (also
discussing al-Shifa bint Abdullah); KAHHALA, supra at 5:67-70 (summarizing biographies of
prominent Muslim women, including story of Baghdadi ruler Umm al-Muqtadir billah, who set
up a female courtier as judge to hear disputes in the public square, citing Tabari, Ibn Athir, Ibn
al-Jawzi, Ibn Miskawih). See also ANWAR AHMAD QADRI, JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL ISLAM
57-58 (1968) (describing cases involving women litigants before a male judge); WIEBKE
WALTHER, WOMEN IN ISLAM (1995) (describing prominent women throughout Muslim history,
including Umm al-Muqtadir billah).
86. MAHMASSANI, supra note 32, at 116. See also KAMALI, supra note 21, at 285 (sum-
marizing changeability of rules where 'urf (custom) has changed, citing al-Shafii's different
rules in Iraq versus Egypt).
87. Najib Ghadbian, Islamists and Women in the Arab World. From Reaction to Reform?,
12 AM. J. ISLAMIC SOC. SCI. 19, 27 (1995).
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Among the many respected leaders of the modem Islamist movement
who follow this attitude are Hasan al-Turabi of Sudan, Rachid al-
Ghanouchi of Tunisia, and Muhammad al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-
Qaradawi of Egypt.8"
The exclusivity of male testimony as an application of cultural male
bias to the Islamic law of zina is unfair. But the exclusion of female
testimony becomes appalling when expanded to apply to zina-bil-jabr as
well. It is a clear travesty of justice to deny a victim of rape the right to
testify to this violent attack merely because she is a woman. In applying
the exclusively male evidence rule of traditional zina law to the crime of
zina-bil-jabr, Pakistan has transformed what was merely an antiquated
male bias into a direct violation of the human rights of women. The
direct contradiction to the Quranic injunctions to stand up firmly for
justice is obvious.
Moreover, depriving women as an entire gender of the right to testify
in a zina or zina-bil-jabr case-where a woman's honor is generally at
issue-has serious societal ramifications. First, it prevents women from
fulfilling the Islamic duty to bear witness to the truth, repeatedly empha-
sized in the Quran.89 But even more significant is the fact that the
permanent rejection of testimony is itself a Quranic hadd penalty. That
is, in its verse prohibiting slander, the Quran establishes that deprivation
of the right to testify is a severe punishment-one of the two conse-
quences of falsely accusing a woman:
Those who defame chaste women, and do not bring four witnesses,
should be punished with eighty lashes, and their testimony should
not be accepted afterwards, for they are profligates. 9'
88. See id. at 27 (citing Hasan al-Turabi's paper, "Women in Islam and Muslim Society,"
which "laid down the theoretical basis of the reformist approach to gender relations, endorsed
unequivocally a fully participatory role for women in politics and in every other sphere of
society and declared that traditional restrictions on women's freedoms had nothing to do with
Islam."); id. (quoting al-Ghanouchi's statement: "We began to ask ourselves sheepishly, to
what extent does our movement express Islam's approach to women, and to what extent have
we freed ourselves from the residue of the era of decline and from our reactions against the
Bourgibian degeneracy?"); id. at 28 (citing al-Ghazali's book, AL SUNNAH AL NABAWIYAH
BAYN AHL AL FiQH WA AHL AL HADITH, which focuses on verses and hadith which conserva-
tives interpret as excluding women from positions of authority, and asserting that "some
authentic juristic interpretations of Islamic law allow women to serve in any public capaci-
ty-as judges, ambassadors, cabinet members, and rulers"); id. (citing 1990fatwa (ruling) of
Yusuf al Qaradawi that women can seek parliamentary and judicial positions, and issue fatwas
with the same authority as men).
89. See, e.g., Quran 4:135 ("0 you who believe, be custodians of justice (and) witnesses
for God, even though against yourselves, or your parents or your relatives ... and if you
prevaricate or avoid (giving evidence), God is cognisant of all that you do.").
90. Quran 24:4 (emphasis added).
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A law which disallows women's testimony in zina cases, then, is tanta-
mount to sentencing all women to one of the Quranic punishments for
slander. This is ironic given the fact that the slander verse is specifically
addressed to the preservation of women's honor-something that is
stripped when one's testimony is not accepted. As one commentator puts
it, "in a Muslim society the rejection of an individual's testimony is
tantamount to outlawing him, [and thus] the rejection of the testimony of
one who has committed a hadd offence is a deterrent measure."9' Elimi-
nation of all female testimony in zina cases thus subjects women to part
of the same punishment as if they had committed a hadd crime, the most
serious type of offense in Islamic law. Quite different from honoring
women, as the Quran dictates, this practice dishonors all women by
insinuating incompetence and weakness of character-the same qualities
attributed to a slanderous witness.
Finally, this rule creates a practical problem. If the rationale for
rejecting a slanderer's testimony is deterrence, then why not also apply
this deterrence to stop women from slandering each other? That is, if
women's testimony is automatically inadmissible, then a woman will
naturally not be deterred by the injunction that a slanderer's testimony
will no longer be admitted. Hence, the Quranic hadd punishment for the
offense of slander (that the slanderer's testimony is rejected ever after)
becomes meaningless to women. Certainly the punishment of flogging
may yet be a deterrent, but why, then, is there the additional punishment
of rejecting future testimony? And why would it apply only to men? The
Quran gives no indication that it means to deter women any less than
men in its injunctions against slander.92 To simply nullify part of the
Quranic punishment for slander, then, seems quite a radical result to be
based merely on outdated cultural attitudes regarding women's com-
petence and societal place.
4. Problems with Zina as Ta'zir
Islamic criminal law acknowledges two categories of crime and
punishment. The first, known as hudood, encompasses crimes specifically
articulated by God in the Quran and through the hadith. Islamic juris-
prudence acknowledges, however, that society may legislate additional
crimes and punishments as needed. These societally legislated crimes and
91. EL-AwA, supra note 26, at 34.
92. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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punishments are called "ta'zir." Ta'zir crimes can sometimes carry much
lighter evidentiary or sentencing schemes than Quranic hudood crimes.93
In Pakistan, when the strict quadruple witness standard of proof is
difficult to meet, it has become increasingly common for zina cases to be
prosecuted as ta'zir crimes, as 'opposed'to hudood crimes. 94 The Zina
Ordinance includes a clause providing for ta'zir prosecutions of zina
where there is less evidence:
Zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir.-
... [W]hoever commits zina or zina-bil-jabr which is not liable
to hadd, or for which proof in either of the forms mentioned...
[i.e. confession or four witnesses] is not available and the pun-
ishment of qazf (slander) liable to hadd has not been awarded to
the complainant, or for which hadd may not be enforced under
this Ordinance, shall be liable to tazir.
95
One seemingly positive aspect of ta 'zir rape prosecutions in Pakistan
is that the relaxed evidentiary rules allow women's testimony, as well as
various forms of circumstantial evidence not allowed in a hadd prosecu-
tion. However, the actual impact upon women in zina cases has not been
positive. One writer states:
Even though this level of punishment permits the testimony of
women, observers of Pakistan's legal system have noted the bias
against women victims and defendants. Courts appear to extend the
benefit of doubt to men accused of rape. However, they set rigorous
standards of proof to female rape victims who allege that the inter-
course was forced. This gender bias has resulted in: (1) women who
find it so difficult to prove zina-bil-jabr [under the hudood require-
93. For further explanation and distinction between hadd and ta 'zir crimes in Islamic law,
see COULSON, supra note 27, at 124; EL-AwA, supra note 26, at 1-2; SIDDIQI, supra note 27,
at 158; Mohammed S. El-Awa, Ta'azir in the Islamic Penal System 1, 6 J. ISLAMIC & COMP.
L. 41 (1976).
94. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 20, at 1372 ("[in contrast to past years, women
are now frequently granted bail for Hadood offenses, and convictions have been markedly
reduced"); DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 12, at 50-52; Mehdi, supra note 10, at 23 (stating
that under working law of rape, almost all cases are tried under ta'zir); Anika Rahman, A View
Towards Women's Reproductive Rights Perspective on Selected Laws and Policies in Pakistan,
15 WHITTIER L. REV. 981, 999-1000 (1994) ("Because of the difficulty of obtaining four male
Muslim witnesses, men accused of zina-bil-jabr have in reality, become exempted from the
maximum punishment. Although maximum Hadd punishments have been imposed, none have
ever been carried out. The majority of zina or zina-bil-jabr cases are thus heard at the lesser
Tazir punishment level.").
95. Zina Ordinance § 10; P.L.D. 1979 Cent. Statutes at 53; MAJOR ACTS, supra note 2,
at 13. The section goes on to prescribe the punishment for zina of imprisonment for ten years,
thirty lashes, and a fine, and for zina-bil-jabr twenty-five years imprisonment and thirty lashes.
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ment of four male witnesses] that they find themselves open to the
possibility of prosecution for zina [under the relaxed ta'zir eviden-
tiary rules]; (2) men accused of zina-bil-jabr being subject to
diminished charges [because the hudood evidence is not proved];
and (3) women who are wrongfully prosecuted and who are afford-
ed restricted protection against such prosecution.96
Thus, the relaxed evidentiary rules of ta'zir (corresponding to its lesser
punishment) open the zina law to further manipulation by authorities,
who may threaten a woman with prosecution for zina under ta'zir evi-
dence if there is not enough proof to convict under hudood. If the
woman is charging rape, this exacerbates the potential injustice of the
situation. A woman might watch her rapist be acquitted for lack of four
witnesses, but herself be subject to prosecution for zina under the looser
evidentiary rules of ta'zir.
This phenomenon should sound familiar:
Those who defame chaste women, and do not bring four witnesses,
should be punished with eighty lashes, and their testimony should
not be accepted afterwards, for they are profligates.97
This is the Quranic verse which started our zina discussion. It contem-
plates the possibility of adultery charges being brought against women
upon less evidence than four witnesses, and condemns it as a grievous
slander. By allowing prosecution for zina as a ta'zir punishment, and
thereby loosening the evidentiary rules, the Pakistani Zina Ordinance has
succeeded in contravening the very Quranic verse upon which it is
based. 98 In fact, zina is the only hadd crime for which the Quran sets out
a specific punishment for not meeting its strict evidentiary rules.99 The
Quran thus indicates that, unlike other hadd crimes, there can be no
ta'zir punishment for zina. That is, for this one crime, if four eyewit-
nesses are not produced, the state and society must walk away and not
speak of it again."°
But the Zina Ordinance goes even further in ignoring the Quranic
injunction of all-or-nothing proof of zina. It includes a provision for
96. Rahman, supra note 94, at 1000.
97. Quran 24:4.
98. See also PATEL, supra note 11, at 30-31 (making same argument that there can be no
ta'zir punishment for zina). This argument, in fact, was the basis of a challenge to the ta'zir
punishment implemented in zina cases in Pakistan. Id. (citing 1983 petition challenging §§ 9(a)
and 10 of the Zina Ordinance on this ground).
99. See AL-SHAF'I, supra note 24, at 247 ("[o]nly the witnesses in the case of adultery
should be scourged.").
100. See supra Part I.B.
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"attempt" of zina, setting forth punishment of imprisonment, whipping,
and a fine.' °' Again, this directly contradicts the spirit of the Islamic law
of zina. Both the Quranic verses quoted above and the hadith of Prophet
Muhammad establish that unless the act was actual penetration, it is not
punishable by the state." 2
There is a compelling Quranic spirit against either a ta'zir or an
attempt version of zina. Unfortunately, the Pakistani Zina Ordinance has
lost sight of the unique status of zina as a hadd crime of public indecen-
cy and expanded it to areas which inevitably result in injustice and
discrimination against women-the focus of the Quranic verses on the
subject in the first place.
II. RAPE IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
In this critique of the Pakistani Zina Ordinance, I have demonstrated
that the crime of zina set forth in the Quran is primarily a societal crime
of public indecency, and for that reason strict evidentiary standards of
proof are attached to its prosecution. We have also seen that some of the
application of the Quranic evidentiary standard for zina has been skewed
by patriarchal culture to the detriment of women's rights. The inadmissi-
bility of women's testimony in zina cases, including rape prosecutions,
is one such example. The creation of a ta'zir version of zina, and the
subcategorization of rape under zina in the first place are other examples
of aspects of Pakistan's zina law which unfairly dishonors its women.
So far, we have seen that the rationale for the strict evidentiary re-
quirements for zina is an affirmance and protection of both female and
male honor: unlawful sexual intercourse will be prosecuted by the state
only when it is publicly indecent. Within the privacy of one's home, the
immorality of the act is something left between the individual and God.
The same rationale would not, however, apply to the crime of rape. In
rape, public display is not the crucial element to the criminality of the
act. Rather, the attack itself is a crime of violence, whether committed in
public or in private. Rape is not consensual sexual intercourse, but a
violent assault against a victim, man or woman, boy or girl, where the
perpetrator uses sex as a weapon. Consistent with our analysis thus far,
the Quran does not include any direct mention of rape under the general
crime of zina. How, then, has Islamic law addressed the crime of rape?
101. See Zina Ordinance § 18; P.L.D. 1979 Cent. Statutes at 55; MAJOR ACTS, supra note
2, at 14-15.
102. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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A. Duress: Rape as a Negation of Intent for Zina
In their chapters on zina, Islamic legal scholars have acknowledged
that where one or more parties engaged in zina under duress, they are not
liable for zina.'03 A hadith of the Prophet Muhammad establishes this
principle: upon a woman's reporting to him that she was forced to
commit adultery, he did not punish her, and he did punish the perpetra-
tor.' 04 Similar rulings by the Caliph Umar ibn Al-Khattab 0 5 and Imam
Malik' 06 further cement this principle in Islamic law. Islamic jurispru-
dence, in fact, devotes much attention to the concept of duress as a
negation of intent, thus eliminating liability for an offense.'07 The appli-
cation of the law of duress to zina has led to a thorough analysis of
liability in possible permutations of forced zina. For example, the
Hedaya devotes several paragraphs to resolving conflicting stories
regarding a sexual encounter where one party claims it was consensual,
and the other claims it was not.'08 Matters become more complicated
where the witnesses to the encounter are of different genders. 0 9 There is
also discussion and difference of opinion as to whether a man can be
forced to commit zina and thus not be liable for hadd punishment."0
Thus, the discussions of forced sex in jurisprudential writings on zina
exhaustively discuss nonconsensual sex as a negation of the requisite
mental state for zina, but does Islamic law address rape as an independent
crime? As it turns out, contrary to what the Pakistani legislation would
suggest, Islamic jurisprudence has in fact not only categorized rape as a
separate criminal offense (under hiraba), but has also allowed civil
compensation to rape survivors (under jirah). These two remedies are
addressed in turn.
103. See HEDAYA, supra note 30, Bk. VII, Ch. II, at 187 (defining compulsion generally);
8 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 54, at 129, 145 (including discussion of exemption from zina
liability for male forced to commit zina); Seminar, supra note 14, at 269 ("[it] is an agreed
position that females subjected to rape against their consent and without their will would be
exonerated from any liability under Islamic law.").
104. See 9 AL-BUKHARI, supra note 28, Bk. 82, Ch. 7; 1 MISHKAT AL-MASABIH 762
(James Robson trans., 2d ed. 1990) (citing hadith transmitted by Tirmidhi and Abu Dawud).
105. See MALIK, supra note 55, § 41.3, at 392 (citing case where Caliph Umar prosecuted
rapist of slave girl and did not prosecute her); 8 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 54, at 129 (citing
case where Caliph Umar released woman who asserted rape).
106. See MALIK, supra note 55, § 41.3, at 392.
107. See generally, Khaled Abou El Fadl, Law of Duress in Islamic Law and Common
Law: A Comparative Study, 30 ISLAMIC STUD. 305 (1991).
108. HEDAYA, supra note 30, Bks. VII, XXI, at 189-95, 353-54.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 187. See also 8 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 54, at 129.
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B. Hiraba: Rape as a Violent Taking
Hiraba is another hadd crime defined in the Quran. It is variously
translated as "forcible taking," "highway robbery," "terrorism," or
"waging war, against the state." The crime of hiraba is based on the
following Quranic verse:
The punishment for those who wage war [yuharibuna] against God
and His Prophet, and perpetrate disorders in the land is: kill or hang
them, or have a hand on one side and a foot on the other cut off or
banish them from the land."'
Islamic legal scholars have interpreted this crime to be any type of
forcible assault upon the people involving some sort of taking of proper-
ty." 2 It differs from ordinary theft in that the Quranic crime of theft
(sariqa) is a taking by stealth whereas hiraba is a taking by force."
3
(Thus, the popular translation as "armed robbery.") Although it is gener-
ally assumed to be violent public harassment, many scholars have held
that it is not limited to acts committed in public places."
14
It is in the discussions of the crime of hiraba where the crime of rape
appears. A brief review of the traditional descriptions of hiraba reveals
that rape is specifically included among its various forms. In Fiqh-us-
Sunnah, a modem summary of the primary traditional schools of thought
on Islamic law, hiraba is described as: a single person or group of people
causing public disruption, killing, forcibly taking property or money,
attacking or raping women ("hatk al 'arad"), killing cattle, or disrupting
agriculture." 5 Reports of individual scholars on the subject further
confirm the hiraba classification of rape." 6 Al-Dasuqi, for example, a
111. Quran 5:33.
112. See EL-AWA, supra note 26, at 7-10; 5 ABDUR RAHMAN AL-HARIRI, KITAB AL-FIQH
'ALA AL-MATHAHIB AL-'ARBA'A 409-11 (1986) [hereinafter FIQH AL-MATHAHIB]; 2 SAYED
SABIQ, FIQH-US-SUNNAH 446 (10th ed. 1993) (chapter on hudood, describing hiraba) [hereinaf-
ter FIQH-US-SUNNAH]; SIDDIQI, supra note 27, at 139-44. See also Doi, supra note 1, at 250
(explaining context of verse revelation: some people came to Muhammad under the auspices
of new converts, complained that the weather in Medina was disagreeable to them, and
Muhammad sent them to live outside the city with cattle belonging to the state; they subse-
quently killed the cattle keeper and stole the cattle and this verse was revealed shortly thereaf-
ter).
113. See Doi, supra note 1, at 250, 254; EL-AwA, supra note 26, at 7.
114. 2 FIQH-US-SUNNAH, supra note 112, at 447.
115. Id. at 450.
116. 5 FIQH AL-MATHAHIB, supra note 112, at 410-11 (summarizing Maliki school defini-
tion of hiraba offender as someone who "obstructs the road, even without intending to take
money, intending to harm someone, or intending to rape a woman ('hatk-il-harim')").
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Maliki jurist, held that if a person forced a woman to have sex, their
actions would be deemed as committing hiraba."7 In addition, the Maliki
judge Ibn 'Arabi, relates a story in which a group was attacked and a
woman in their party raped. Responding to the argument that the crime
did not constitute hiraba because no money was taken and no weapons
used, Ibn 'Arabi replied indignantly that "hiraba with the private parts"
is much worse than a hiraba involving the taking of money, and that
anyone would rather be subjected to the latter than the former." 8 The
famous Spanish Muslim jurist, Ibn Hazm, a follower of the Zahiri school,
reportedly had the widest definition of hiraba, defining a hiraba offender
as:
[Olne who puts people in fear on the road, whether or not with a
weapon, at night or day, in urban areas or in open spaces, in the
palace of a caliph or a mosque, with or without accomplices, in the
desert or in the village, in a large or small city, with one or more
people... making people fear that they'll be killed, or have money
taken, or be raped ("hatk al 'arad") ... whether the attackers are
one or many.""..9
Thus, even this cursory review of traditional Islamic jurisprudence
shows that the crime of rape is classified not as a subcategory of zina, but
rather as a separate crime of violence under hiraba. In Islam, sexual
autonomy and pleasure is a fundamental right for women as well as
men; 2 ° taking by force someone's right to control the sexual activity of
one's body is thus logically classified as a form of hiraba."'
117. Doi, supra note 1, at 253.
118. See 2 FIQH-US-SUNNAH, supra note 112, at 450.
119. Id.
120. See 7 AL-BUKHARI, supra note 28, Nos. 135-36; 2 AL-GHAZZALI, IHYA-ULUM-UD-
DIN [MARRIAGE AND SEXUALITY IN ISLAM] 106-107 (Madelain Farah trans., 1984) (book on
etiquette of marriage, citing hadith re: rights of wife for sexual pleasure); B.F. MUSULLAM, SEX
AND SOCIETY IN ISLAM 28-38 (1983) (including hadith and discussion of contraception if it
interferes with wife's sexual satisfaction); Azizah al-Hibri, A Study of Islamic Herstory: or How
Did We Ever Get Into This Mess?, in WOMEN AND ISLAM 213 (Azizah al-Hibri ed., 1982)
(citing hadith about foreplay); Symposium, Religious Law: Roman, Catholic, Islamic, and
Jewish Treatment of Familial Issues, Including Education, Abortion, In Vitro Fertilization,
Prenuptial Agreements, Contraception, and Marital Fraud, 16 LOYOLA INT'L & COMP. L.J. 10,
92 (citing schools of thought on role of woman's sexual pleasure in legality of marriage con-
tract).
121. It is interesting to note that the concept of a woman's sexuality as her property is in
fact not a new one to the crime of rape. The western crime of rape evolved from the early
Roman law of "raptus" which was defined as "a form of violent theft that could apply to both
property and person." Dolly F. Alexander, Comment, Twenty Years of Morgan: A Criticism of
the Subjectivist View of Mens Rea and Rape in Great Britain, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 207, 212
(1995). See also Dripps, supra note 42, at 1781. Note that this principle could also be applied
to expand the Islamic law of rape to include the rape of men as another instance of the violent
taking of an individual's sexual autonomy.
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Moreover, classification of rape under hiraba promotes the principle
of honoring women's sexual dignity established in the Quranic verses on
zina. Rape as hiraba is a separate violent crime which uses sexual
intercourse as a weapon. The focus in a hiraba prosecution would thus
be the accused rapist and his intent and physical actions, rather than sec-
ond-guessing the consent of the rape victim, as we have seen is likely to
happen in a zina-bil-jabr case. 22
Finally, hiraba does not require four witnesses to prove the offense,
unlike zina. Circumstantial evidence and expert testimony, then, presum-
ably form the evidence used to prosecute such crimes. In addition to
eyewitness testimony, medical data and expert testimony, a modem
hiraba prosecution of rape would likely take advantage of modem
technological advances such as forensic and DNA testing.
C. Jirah: Rape as Bodily Harm
Islamic legal responses to rape are not limited to a criminal prosecu-
tion for hiraba. Islamic jurisprudence also creates an avenue for civil
redress for a rape survivor in its law of 'jirah" (wounds). Islamic law
designates ownership rights to each part of one's body, and a right to
corresponding compensation for any harm done unlawfully to any of
those parts. 23 Islamic criminal law calls this the law of jirah. Harm to a
sexual organ, therefore, entitles the person harmed to appropriate financial
compensation under classical Islamic jirah jurisprudence. 24 Thus, each
school of Islamic law has held that where a woman is harmed through
sexual intercourse (some include marital intercourse), she is entitled to
financial compensation for the harm. Further, where this intercourse was
without the consent of the woman, the perpetrator must pay the woman
both the basic compensation for the harm, as well as an additional
amount based on the diyya (financial compensation for murder, akin to
a wrongful death payment).
125
Since rape could occur even without a clear threat of physical force
(i.e. thus perhaps not constituting hiraba, but nonetheless constituting sex
without consent), the categorization of rape under the Islamic law ofjirah
122. See supra Part I.C.2.
123. See 8 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 54, at 3 (introduction; describing law ofjirah, classifi-
cation of injuries, etc.).
124. Id. at 36. Note that the law ofjirah (in addition to other principles of Islamic law)
providing for compensation for physical harm even between spouses would support modem
Islamic legislation against domestic abuse.
125. Id. (discussing varying applications ofjirah under four Sunni schools of thought);
BOKHARY, supra note 2, at 219 (stating where someone is forced to commit zina, she is not
punished for zina, but rather entitled to compensation).
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also makes logical sense. This categorization would provide financial
compensation to every victim of rape for any harm done to their body as
a result of the attack. Taking the analysis further, because the right to
control one's own sexual activity is a fundamental Islamic and human
right, 26 it could be argued that invasion of one's sexual organs against
one's will constitutes harm, even where there is no physical bruising or
tearing. Modem Islamic jurisprudence and legislation could therefore
choose to provide that either instead of, or in addition to hiraba punish-
ment against the rapist, a woman might also claim compensation for her
ordeal under the principle of jirah.1
27
Interestingly, Western legal discourse has just recently begun to
reevaluate the crime of rape, and is still struggling to overcome its male-
oriented articulation of the crime. If Islamic jurisprudence were to
continue its development in the direction outlined above, jirah principles
provide an interesting alternative remedy. Islamic law has the unique re-
source of ajirah system of established bodily compensation law to apply
as one response to the crime of nonconsensual intercourse, if it were
recognized in modern Islamic legislation. In Western history, ancient
Roman law also recognized compensation as a means of resolving a rape
dispute, but it took a more patriarchal approach: it found that the father
(or other male authority) of the rape victim was owed damages because
rape implied his inability to protect the woman. 28 Islamic law, with its
radical introduction of a woman's right to own property as a fundamental
right, already employs a gender-egalitarian attitude in this area of juris-
prudence. In fact, there is a hadith specifically directed to transforming
the early Muslim population out of this patriarchal attitude of male
financial compensation for female sexual activity. During the time of
Prophet Muhammad, a young man committed zina with his employer's
wife. The father of the young man gave one hundred goats and a maid
as compensation to the employer, who accepted it. When the case was
reported to the Prophet, he ordered the return of the goats and the maid
to the young man's father and prosecuted the adulterer for zina. 129 Early
Islam thus established that there should be no tolerance of the attitude
that a woman's sexual activity is something to be bartered, pawned, or
owned by the men in her life. Personal responsibility of every human
being for his or her own actions is a fundamental principle in Islamic
thought.
126. See supra note 120.
127. Again, this analysis would also provide for male rape victims.
128. See Dripps, supra note 42, at 1780-81.
129. 3 ABU DAWUD, supra note 28, Bk. 33, No. 4430; 8 AL-BUKHARI, supra note 28, Bk.
81, Nos. 815, 821, 826.
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Recent discussions of marital rape among Western scholars 130 can also
be compared to the debate among Islamic legal scholars regarding wheth-
er a husband is obligated to pay his wife when she is physically harmed
from sexual intercourse brings up an interesting question: Is there a
recognition of marital rape in Islam.13 1 In the context of jirah, it would
appear so: where there is any physical harm caused to a spouse, there
may be a claim for jirah compensation. 132 Even in these discussions of
appropriate jirah compensation, the question the injured party's consent
plays a central role. Some Islamic jurists considered consent to be
presumed by virtue of the marital relationship, while others maintained
that where harm occurs, it is an assault, regardless of the consent, and
therefore compensation is due. 133 In our modem era, one might take these
precedents and their premium focus on consent and apply the Islamic
principle of sexual autonomy to conclude that any sex without consent is
harmful, as a dishonoring of the unwilling party's sexual autonomy. Thus,
modem Islamic jurists and legislators, taking a gender-egalitarian perspec-
tive, might conclude that Islamic law does recognize marital rape, and
assign the appropriate injunctions and compensation for this personally
devastating harm.
CONCLUSION: A MODERN ISLAMIC GENDER-
EGALITARIAN LAW OF RAPE?
And so we return to the initial question: do Pakistan's criminal laws
articulate the Islamic law of rape? We have seen that they do not. But
they could have. Islamic jurisprudence includes a law of rape with two
very appropriate avenues to justly respond to the crime, its seriousness,
and its effect on women in particular. Unfortunately, the drafters of Paki-
stan's Hudood Ordinance and the Shariah court which implemented it
took no notice of this precedent in creating Pakistan's zina law. The
result has been injustice to the women of Pakistan, and a disservice to
Islamic law. This brief investigation into some of the traditional Islamic
130. See, e.g., Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Note, Liberia Revisited A Call to Repeal the
Marital Exemption for all Sex Offenses in New York's Penal Law, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857
(1996).
131. Notably, the Pakistani Zina Ordinance categorically eliminates this possibility, by
defining zina-bil-jabr as unconsensual intercourse with someone "to whom he or she is not
validly married." See supra note 7 and accompanying text (a description also popular in old
common law definitions of rape).
132. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
133. See 8 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 54, at 36. See also Jilani, supra note 66, at 73 (citing
case where medical evidence revealed marks of violence on woman's body, but found no rape
due to existence of marriage certificate: "[alt best, it can be said to be misuse of the wife," said
the court).
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jurisprudence on rape shows that it is more than feasible for modem
Muslim legislators to take the tools offered in Islamic jurisprudence on
hiraba and jirah to form a comprehensive gender-egalitarian law of rape,
one which does not counteract the positive honoring of women which is
inherent in the Quranic verses on zina. Rape should be specified as a
form of hiraba in the hiraba section of modem hudood statutes, thus
identifying it as a violent crime for which the perpetrator is subject to
serious punishment. In fact, Pakistan already has a hiraba chapter in its
Hudood Ordinance. 34 Modern Islamic legislation might also designate
rape as a harm under jirah, thus creating grounds for rape victims to
receive some compensation for the harm caused to their bodies and sexual
autonomy.
Modem Islamic jurists, legislatures, members of the judiciary and the
bar must work out the logistical details of these laws, and what combi-
nation of hiraba and jirah should apply in a given situation and society.
A greater challenge, perhaps, is changing the cultural attitudes towards
women which helped to create the existing laws in the first place. That
ongoing effort must be undertaken simultaneously with any official
legislative changes, in order to give real effect to such legislation, and to
give life to the Quranic verses honoring women.
134. See MAJOR ACTS, supra note 2, at 7.
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